E-voting: Can't attack the study? Why not just attack the authors?

Following on from recent posts on e-voting and Diebold, from a post from Prof. David Dill at Stanford:

"The results reported in the Johns Hopkins/Rice study are generally accurate and can be independently checked.

"Diebold's attempts to 'rebut' the study have been so lame that they have now resorted to attacking the authors. If Diebold is sincerely concerned about 'bias' in the Johns Hopkins/Rice study, it would be easy to clear up: They should simply agree to an a review of the study and the code upon which it is based by truly independent computer security experts. It would help greatly if they would release the reviewers from any liability from violations of copyright or trade secret law in the process (Diebold would have no legitimate basis for objecting to this, since the code has been downloaded by hundreds or thousands of unknown individuals already).

"I doubt that Diebold would do this, because they know that the results of such a review would confirm the major findings of the study. No matter how much propaganda they churn out, they will never be able to justify 'wiring' cryptographic keys into the software.

"For more background on the Diebold security flaws and their rebuttal of the Johns Hopkins/Rice report, see the commentary by Prof. Douglas Jones of the University of Iowa. http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/dieboldftp.html#rebuttals
Jones is a computer scientist and election machine examiner for the state of Iowa."